}
2
structed from (1) Peking* to Harbin (via Jehol and Tao-nan-fu), and (2) from Tsitsihar
to Mergen.
He was promised an opportunity of discussing the matter with M. Stolypin, and was told that the project would be laid before the Council of Ministers.
Russia has recently sent a commission to these regions to investigate, and it is perhaps not too much to suppose that M. Kokovtsoff's inclination to favour the present scheme is based on its report.
The following considerations may throw some light on Russia's attitude, and I have drawn up the accompanying rough map in order to illustrate them.
1. By the Secret Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1907 (confirmed in 1910) spheres of influence were established in Manchuria, but the line of demarcation of these spheres From the stopped short to the westward at the parallel of 122 east of Greenwich.
available here it is impossible to locate Tao-nan-fu exactly, but it appears to lie very near that parallel and the projected railway, could probably be so arranged as not to encroach anywhere on the Japanese sphere.
maps
2. By the same secret agreement Russia is given a free hand in Outer Mongolia. Moreover, according to Lord ffrench, she holds an option for a line from Hailar to Peking, and on M. Kokovtsoff's own showing, she is afraid of Japan, and convinced that sooner or later the whole of Southern Manchuria will fall to the Japanese. In these circumstances, the advantage to Russia of a Chinese railway running up between ber sphere of influence in Mongolia and the Japanese sphere of Southern Manchuria is obvious. The Chinese line would, the Chinese hope, act as a colonising factor, and, if this hope is realised, a wedge of thickly-populated Chinese territory would be driven in between Russia and Japan.
3. The difficulty of supplying Vladivostock with meat has long been a nuch- discussed problem. At the time of the Russo-Japanese war, meat went up to famine prices, and all the deer on the outlying islands were killed off to supply the town. The lines from Mergen to Tsitsihar and from Tao-nan-fu to Harbin, would both tap rich cattle districts, and their construction would greatly assist in the solution of the problem.
4. The strategic value of the line to Russia would be considerable.
It would give ber direct and rapid communication with Peking, without touching anywhere on Japanese lines or spheres of influence, and it would not be open to Japanese attack from the sea.
Other points to consider are the probable attitudes of the Japanese and Chinese.
1. The Japanese will probably object strongly, but if the line is kept carefully to the west of the 122nd degree of longitude and is supported by the Russians, it is hard to see how, in view of the terms of their secret agreement with Russia, they can veto the construction of the line.
2. The one aim and object of the Chinese is to save some part of Manchuria before it is too late. They propose to do this by a system of colonisation. The Chinchow- Aigun scheme would probably have been more effective for this purpose, and the port on the Gulf of Pe-chi-li was doubtless an attraction, but that scheme has for the present been absolutely vetoed, and the suggested alternative line has its advantages. It would probably be a good deal more costly to build, and its strategic value to Russia might militate against it in the eyes of the Chinese, but on the other hand it would bave its terminus in the capital, would be comparatively safe from the Japanese, would open up new country, and would be connected with a ready-made port at Tient-sin, the trade of which it would doubtless do much to foster.
P.S. Since writing the above, I have again seen Lord ffrench, who tells me that on the 4th April he was received by M. Stolypine. M. Stolypine assured him that he personally was in favour of the scheme, but said that he could not give him a definite reply in the name of the Government until he had talked the matter over with the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Finance and War.
* In 1903 Mr. Claud Russell and the Hon. Michael Hicks-Beach travelled from Peking to Tsitsihar viâ Jehol, following in their first stages very much the line which the projected railway would take. I believe Mr. Russell furnished a short report of his journey to the Foreign Ofice and published an account of it in the "Geographical Jourual," The country, even to-day, is very little known, and these accounts might be
of interest.
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.}
C O
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.
15371
[April 10.]
CONFIDENTIAL
[13247]
Rece Rrat || MAY ||
No. 1.
SECTION 3.
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received April 10.)
(No. 126.) Sir,
Pekang, March 22, 1911. WITH reference to my telegram No. 70 of the 7th instant, relative to the dispute which has arisen between the Portuguese aud Chinese authorities on the subject of a sea-wall at Macao, I have the honour to report that his Majesty's consul-general at Canton informs me in a further telegram, dated the 16th March, that no agreement had so far resulted from the meeting. The Viceroy at Canton had asked not only that the dyke should be allowed to stand, but that the adjacent riparian owners to the south of it, on the Portuguese side of the provisional line of 1890, should be allowed to extend the construction. It appears that the Governor of Macao is prepared to agree
d'affaires.
to the first part of this request, but that he will under no circumstances assent to the second. The position is aggravated by the local self-government societies, who are endeavouring to inflame public opinion, and it is seemingly further complicated by a divergence of views between the Governor of Macao and the Portuguese chargé
No progress is likely to be made in the matter until instructions arrive from
I have, &c.
J. N. JORDAN.
Lisbon.
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